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Abstract: This paper critically examines and explains the increasingly influential idea of 
‘global governance’. After outlining the evolving intentional order and the new actors 
that are prominent part of contemporary governance structures, I assess the implication 




At a time when most of the world is being affected by a variety of political, economic 
and social processes subsumed under the rubric of globalization, it is unsurprising that 
patterns of governance would be similarly transformed. If globalisation is understood 
as ‘a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organisation of social relations and transactions… generating transcontinental or 
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power’ 
(Held et al 1999: 16), and if governance is understood as ‘all those activities of social, 
political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, 
steer, control or manage societies’ (Kooiman: 1993: 2), then it was almost inevitable 
that these concepts would come together in an effort to describe the way the 
contemporary international system functions. The key point that distinguishes global 
governance, as opposed to the traditional national form, is that the purposive 
component of governance that Kooiman rightly highlights has much more complex, 
increasingly transnational origins than ever before.  
 
To understand the transformation that has occurred in the way systems of rule and 
authority operate, the way broadly domestic and international processes interact, and 
the vast array of new actors that are influencing or attempting to influence political 
and economic issues in the contemporary international order, we need to explore the 
way the international system has developed over the last fifty years or so. 
Consequently, I initially sketch some of the key changes that have occurred in the 
post-World War II global political economy, before considering the role played by the 
numerous non-state actors that have become such a prominent part in emerging 
patterns of  global governance. While the picture that emerges is complex, and despite 
the fact that our conceptualisations of the processes involved remain incomplete and 
theoretically contested, there is no doubt that the way many of the most important 
social, political and economic processes are developing is of a different qualitative 
order than has existed for the preceding four of five hundred years. In short, at both a 
thoeretical and practical level the idea that we live in a world that is shaped 
exclusively or even primarily by the actions of nation states is no longer supportable 
and we need new ways of thinking about the way the world works. Global governance 
offers one way of beginning to think about such issues. 
 
The Evolving International Order 
 
Although there is an important debate about the extent and historical origins of 
processes associated with globalisation, what we can say is that many of the 
economic, political and even social processes associated with this idea are of a 
qualitatively different order at the present time. Although some of these issues are 
dealt with elsewhere in this volume, it is worth briefly highlighting a number of these 
changes as they to explain why new patterns of governance may have been to some 
extent a ‘functional’ necessity. Put differently, some scholars have persuasively 
argued that given an increasingly integrated economic system that transcends national 
borders and political jurisdictions, a degree of transnational cooperation is an 
inescapable prerequisite for international commerce to operate effectively and 
securely (Cerny 1995). 
 
Many of these changes are well known and can be simply noted. The rise of 
transnational corporations, the remarkable growth of international financial markets 
and the vastly expanded flows of foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment 
these  developments have generated, have not simply reconfigured the international 
economic order, they have also profoundly affected individual states. This 
transformation is highlighted firstly, by the fact that some private sector companies 
are now larger economic actors than many individual national economies and 
secondly, by the disjuncture between the scale of capital flows and national 
economies. What is equally important to recognise is that this situation, in which 
private sector driven forces have assumed a more prominent role in managing aspects 
of the global economy, and in which states are arguably in relative retreat (Strange 
1996), has come about as a consequence of specific set of geopolitical circumstances. 
 
The pivotal moment in the emergence of new patterns of global governance occurred 
in the aftermath of the Second World War under the auspices of U.S hegemony. 
While the detail of this process is considered elsewhere, the important point to stress 
is that under American leadership a new international order was systematically and 
intentionally created. As far as emergent processes of global governance are 
concerned a couple of points are especially significant. First, it was an order that 
promoted a form of liberal, free market-oriented economic activity that would 
ultimately colonise most of the world, and which was designed to encourage greater 
openness and economic integration. Second, to facilitate and regulate greater 
economic integration, a number of new intergovernmental organisations were 
established to help manage the new international order. The so-called Bretton Woods 
institutions – the World Bank,  the IMF,  and the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (later to be replaced by the WTO), represented a new and decisive step on the 
road to global governance.  
 
The creation of such organisations and the steady evolution of an array of other 
intergovernmental, quasi-state and private sector organisations has led – in Western 
Europe, at least – to the consolidation of ‘thick’ institutional infrastructure that has 
actually facilitated and permitted new patterns of transnational governance (Amin and 
Thrift 1994). In many ways, however, the rapid development of cross border political 
cooperation and institutional coordination that characterises development within 
Western Europe, and the ‘pooling’ of national sovereignty that is so characteristic of 
the European Union (EU), is the exception that proves the rule: in other parts of the 
world like East Asia, the state remains a much more central player, the private sector 
is less developed and independent, and national sovereignty is still jealously guarded 
(Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998). At the outset, therefore, we need to guard against 
sweeping generalisations about the contemporary ‘global’ order and recognise that 
there are important variations in patterns of governance within it. 
 
A couple of further points ought to be emphasised in this regard. First, some states are 
far more powerful than others, and have a concomitantly greater capacity to influence 
the way the international system operates. Indeed, European states pioneered a form 
of global governance during their colonisation of much of the planet in the nineteenth 
century, a process that paved the way for more recent patterns of interaction and 
which helps to explain the different styles and capacities with which countries 
respond to the ubiquitous challenges of globalisation (Hobsbawm 1987). These earlier 
experiences also serve as a reminder that contemporary  forms of governance and 
globalisation are not entirely novel or unprecedented. However, the second point to 
stress is that the intensification, depth and complexity of transnational relationships, 
and the increasingly prominent role on non-state actors means that we inhabit a 
qualitatively different international order. The international system that emerged in 
the post-war period highlighted the evermore apparent reality that states were no 
longer the sole or necessarily always the most important regulators of international 
economic activity, and that they would increasingly share authority and responsibility 
with new actors in the international system. 
 
Theorising global governance 
 
Before looking at how these new processes of global governance work in practice, it 
is worth considering how the emerging order has been seen theoretically. A number of 
prominent scholars have made significant contributions to our understanding of the 
changing international order, none more so than James Rosenau. In a path-breaking 
essay written in the early 1990s Rosenau outlined his conception of ‘governance 
without government’, or the persistence of an international order that is not solely 
dependent on the activities of national governments. For Rosenau, global order 
consisted of three interconnected levels of activity: ideational, behavioural and 
political.  
 
The ideational level, as the name suggests, is concerned with the way people inter-
subjectively perceive the order of which they are a part. The ruling ideas or the 
dominant values of an era are critical in this regard, as is the capacity to define and 
produce them in ways that ‘naturalise’ a particular political and economic order. This 
is why some Marxist scholars are so concerned with the ideational or ideological 
aspects of cultural imperialism and hegemony, and the capacity for the leading state 
and non-state actors to manufacture the conventional wisdom or common sense of the 
day (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995). Marxists and critical theorists are not the only 
ones interested in the role of ideas and their influence on patterns of governance, 
however. Oran Young, for example, has also made a major contribution to our 
understanding of the way governance works. Young, focuses on the particular 
‘regimes’ that inform actor behaviour in specific issue areas. For Young (1999: 5), 
regimes are ‘sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and/or programs that give rise 
to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and govern their 
interaction’. In this context, regimes are a potentially useful way of capturing the 
‘horizontal’ patterns of governance and authority that characterise the management of 
issues which are not driven in a ‘top-down’ fashion, but which involve a range of new 
actors and forces.  
 
The second aspect of Rosenau’s schema is the behavioural or objective level - or, 
more simply, the routinised patterns of activity that are the conscious or unconscious  
expressions of inter-subjective understandings. Market-oriented behaviour is, perhaps, 
the most important example of recurrent activities that are not ‘natural’, but the 
pervasive product of particular historical and even geopolitical circumstances. It is no 
coincidence that Rosenau and other scholars became preoccupied with questions of 
global governance in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when major 
alternatives to the geographic expansion and ideological dominance of capitalism 
were decisively eclipsed. The third level of Rosenau’s model of global order brings us 
back to the creation of the post-war order that played such a large part in liberal 
capitalism’s ascension and the prominent role played by the ‘formal and organised 
dimension of the prevailing order’ (Rosenau 1992: 15). In addition to the Bretton 
Woods institutions, Rosenau also recognises the importance - especially during the 
Cold War period – of security organisations like NATO in encouraging particular 
forms of behaviour at both the individual and inter-state levels, as well as in 
consolidating a dominant ideological perspective. 
 
More recently, Rosenau has drawn attention to the way responsibility for key 
decision-making processes has shifted away from the traditional political realm of the 
nation state, to new actors in the economic and social realms. Such processes have, he 
claims, been driven by the ending of the Cold War, the pursuit of more representative 
forms of political organisation, the capacity skilled individuals have to access political 
processes, and by the global interconnectedness of issues as diverse as  the 
environment, AIDS, and economic regulation that necessarily transcend national 
borders (Rosenau 1995). Importantly, in a number of critical issue areas authority for 
policy formulation and regulatory responsibility has passed from national 
governments to non-state actors (Rosenau 1990). To see why this is potentially  
important, it is necessary to spell out how the system has changed and who the new 
players are. 
 
Structure and Agency in Global Governance 
 
One way of thinking about governance and the factors that distinguish it under 
conditions of globalisation is to consider the levels at which it occurs. Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye, who were amongst the first people to draw attention to the 
increasing degree of ‘interdependence’ that characterised the international system in 
the post-war period (Keohane and Nye 1977), have recently suggested that 
contemporary patterns of governance occur at three different, relatively distinct levels 
(Keohane and Nye 2000). In an historical context, the most novel level is the 
supranational, which is compromised of transnational corporations, inter-
governmental organisations like the WTO, the IMF and United Nations. ‘Below’ this 
is the familiar realm of the nation state, and nationally-based firms and organisations. 
At a yet ‘lower’ level are local governments, firms and actors that do not have a 
national presence. The complex, multi-dimensional interaction between these 
different levels provides a form of governance, or ‘the processes and institutions, both 
formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group’ 
(Keohane and Nye 2000: 12). 
 
One of the ‘groups’ to have attracted most attention of late, and one that operates at 
all three levels of Keohane and Nye’s schema, is the non-governmental organization 
(NGO). These institutions are analysed in more detail elsewhere in this volume, but 
given that some observers believe international non-government organizations 
(INGOs) are helping to redefine the way patterns of global governance occur 
(Slaughter 1997), it is important to highlight briefly a number of their most salient 
aspects. The most striking feature of INGOs is their remarkable growth: INGOs have 
increased from about 800 in 1900, to over 4,000 by 1980, leading some observers to 
see them as an inevitable corollary of the expansion of both the world economy and 
the inter-state system, and a key element in the emergence of a ‘world culture’ (Boli 
and Thomas 1999). Certainly, non-state actors like INGOs have become much more 
visible and integral parts of the international system, but it is also important to 
recognise that many of these organisations are small, unable to influence events in any 
direct way, and may not necessarily support ‘progressive’ causes (Morris-Suzuki 
2000). Greenpeace may be an INGO, but so are a number of right-wing, reactionary 
and racist political organisations. In other words, we can’t assume anything about the 
nature of causes an INGO might support, or about its capacity to influence events. 
 
It is important to keep these caveats in mind when considering the growth of ‘global 
civil society’, which a number of authors assume is both inevitable and desirable. 
Lipshutz (1992), for example, argues that the rise of global civil society is an 
inevitable corollary to the apparent decline of the state and a site for the creation of a 
counter-hegemonic discourse that may challenge the dominance of consumer 
capitalism. Similarly, in one of the most comprehensive analyses of global civil 
society yet undertaken, John Keane (2003) is equally enthusiastic about its prospects, 
and sees it both as a mechanism for the inculcation of peaceful values and as a central 
component of a new form of ‘cosmocracy’. The cosmocracy – ‘a conglomeration of 
interlocking and over-lapping sub-state, state and suprastate institutions and multi-
dimensional processes that interact, and have political and social effects, on a global 
scale’ (Keane 2003: 98) – is broadly similar to Keohane’s and Nye’s model. What is 
distinctive about Keane’s position is his positive view about the relationship between 
business and civil society. For Keane, the distinction between the market and civil 
society is ‘artificial’, as capitalism effectively structures society. Moreover, business 
has a functional need for an effectively functioning civil society. In other words, it is 
in the interests of capitalists to encourage the development of civil society. 
 
Business interests and global governance 
 
While this view of the business-societal relationship might seem somewhat 
Panglossian, it does acknowledge one pervasive aspect of contemporary patterns of 
governance: business interests are influential actors in processes of global governance 
and have assumed an increasingly prominent functional role in shaping critical 
regulatory outcomes in areas formerly managed by states. What is less often 
recognised is just how pervasive and integral to new patterns of governance business 
interests have become. John Braithwaite’s and Peter Drahos’s (2000) landmark study 
of global business regulation has detailed just how extensive and influential the 
private sector now is. In many of the most important areas of transnational 
commercial activity and regulation  – property, trade, telecommunications, food, 
transportation and the financial sector – ‘experts’ from the private sector have 
frequently played prominent roles in shaping the regulatory frameworks that govern 
particular issue areas. Self-regulation by industry, in which the representatives of key 
businesses and industries develop regulatory regimes and then ‘model’ appropriate 
practice through the inculcation of particular norms, is at the heart of the new style of 
governance in which the private sector plays such a prominent part. 
 
There are a number of examples of important industries where governments have 
allowed markets and the private sector institutions that inform and mange them to 
make the regulatory running at the cost of governmental authority. One of the most 
important industries in this regard is the international financial sector which has 
expanded dramatically since the early 1970s and which has the capacity to profoundly 
influence the autonomy and position of individual governments and the economies 
they attempt to manage. The regulation of securities markets, for example, is 
something that is managed primarily by unelected actors from the private sector 
(Underhill 1995). Equally significant, the credit ratings agencies that play such a 
crucial role in providing market participants with information are similarly 
independent of governments and have an increasing capacity to make judgements that 
directly influence capital and interest rate movements (Sinclair 2001) – judgements 
that inevitably constrain the degree of policy autonomy available to individual 
governments, especially those outside to core economies of Europe, Japan and North 
America. 
 
A more subtle, but highly significant and influential example of the shift to non-
governmental modes of regulation can be seen in the increased prominence and 
independence of central banks. Across most of the OECD countries, central bankers 
have been given a greater degree of policy-making independence, frequently 
assuming sole responsibility for interest rate policy. More importantly as far as issues 
of global governance are concerned, the fashion for granting greater policy 
independence to central bankers has been consolidated and expanded through the 
auspices of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), a forum in which central 
bankers from the G 10 countries help to set the regulatory framework for domestic 
banking sectors. Although some authors have rightly stressed continuing differences 
in national banking sectors (Kapstein 1994), as Susan Strange (1998: 176) points out 
‘financial innovation, liberalisation, and  sharpened competition between banks and 
other private enterprises’ have steadily eroded the capacity for national governments 
to independently regulate ‘domestic’ firms and practices. Indeed, the very nature of 
the technological and competitive innovations associated with the information 
economy that the global financial sector epitomises has led some observers to 
conclude that the era of the national economy and the capacity for discrete national 
patterns of regulation is definitively over (Korbin 2002). 
 
States and Global Governance 
 
It might be supposed from the increased importance of private sector and inter-
governmental agencies in the new global governance that the nation-state is in 
permanent decline. This view is supported by those authors who draw attention to 
more generalised features of globalisation, in which states are apparently competing 
with each other to create ‘business friendly’ regulatory environments in the hope of 
attracting inflows of investment, especially the ‘direct’ variety associated with job 
creation. Philip Cerny (1996), for example, describes the underlying dynamic of this  
competitive international environment as ‘regulatory arbitrage’, and argues that 
individual governments are complicit in undermining both their own autonomy and 
the general regulatory standards that govern economic activity across the world. 
 
Wolfgang Reinicke (1998) is more sanguine about the impact of globalisation on the 
capacity of individual state’s to govern, and argues that they can respond proactively 
to such challenges through ‘cooperative competition’. In this formulation, states 
maintain substantial sovereignty relative to each other through coordinated policy 
responses to changes associated with the evolution of the global economy. The 
growth of intergovernmental organisations like the EU, and to a lesser extent NAFTA 
and the Asia Pacific Cooperation (APEC) forum illustrate how such cooperative 
strategies might be institutionalised. Significantly, however, Reinicke (1998: 61) 
acknowledges that under conditions of cooperative competition governments ‘do not 
necessarily represent the general public interest’. In other words, even if individual 
states can retain a degree of authority and autonomy by embracing cooperative 
strategies and coordinating policy with other states, the overall rationality or guiding 
principles that inform their actions may have more to do with narrowly conceived 
business interests than they do with the individual polities they claim to represent.  
 
The anti-democratic potential of governance by unelected officials in key inter-
governmental agencies like the IMF or the host of lower-profile but influential 
organisations that govern many areas of transnational economic activity has long been 
recognised. This anti-democratic potential has implications that extend far beyond the 
liberal democracies of the core economies. As David Held (1995)  points out, there is  
 
‘a striking paradox to note about the contemporary era: from Africa to Eastern Europe, 
Asia to Latin America, more and more nations and groups are championing the idea of 
“the rule of the people”; but they are doing so at just the moment when the very efficacy 
of democracy as a national form of political organization appears open to question. As 
substantial areas of human activity are progressively organised on a global level, the fate 
of democracy, and of the independent democratic nation-state in particular is fraught with 
difficulty’ (Held 1995: 21). 
 
One of the biggest potential challenges to the idea of globalisation in particular and to 
global governance more generally is that existent patterns of rule, authority, and order 
are seen to systematically favour the developed world at the expanse of the 
developing nations (Higgott 2000). As Reinicke (1998: 227) points out, if processes 
associated with globalisation are to be sustained, if global public policy is to become 
more reality than rhetoric, ‘the governments of developing countries will have to 
participate in it’. Yet despite the diffusion of authority to a range of new actors, and 
despite the apparent diminution of the power of states generally, even ‘global’ 
patterns of governance exhibit some familiar, hierarchically structured patterns of 
power that do not bode well for meaningful democratic representation or the effective 
inclusion of new players. 
 
The more things change...? 
 
To understand this apparent paradox, we need to revisit Braithwaite’s and Drahos’s 
exploration of global business regulation, for as they point out, even  
 
‘in the era of information capitalism and the new regulatory state, control from the 
nation’s territory of abstract objects like patents is crucial to building the nation’s wealth, 
as is embedding global principles of regulation that suit the wealth-creators from that 
state’s territory. The resilience of US power that many expected to wane in the 1990s can 
be understood in terms of the masterful work of the Clinton administration in these areas’ 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 475). 
 
This might seem a somewhat surprising observation at a time when US HEGEMONY 
has assumed a more unilateral and militaristic style under the administration of 
George W. Bush, but it is, nevertheless, one that captures something important about 
evolving patterns of governance. The capacity to shape the ruling ideas and regulatory 
architecture, the ability to assert influence through nominally independent inter-
governmental agencies like the IMF (Pauly 1997), and the possibility that private 
sector organisations may continue to reflect the perspectives of businesses from 
specific countries, all entrench the interests of particular countries and groups. While 
some might prefer to describe the way this more diffuse, multi-level form of power 
operates in terms of an evolving transnational class that transcends narrowly defied 
national borders (Robinson and Harris 2000), the salient point is that it is still possible 
to detect the clear influence of national forces and interests in the way major 
regulatory processes develop. For example, recent changes in the regulation of patents 
and copyright, highlighted by the trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
agreements, reflect both the growing importance of the service sector in the American 
economy, and the capacity of American-based business to influence the US 
government to place TRIPS on the intentional policy-making agenda (Sell 2000). 
 
It is the persistence of patterns of order that bear the continuing imprint of American 
power in particular and of ‘Western’ interests more generally that has led some 
authors to conclude that - at best - we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘global state’ 
that entrenches and builds upon the institutional order created at Bretton Woods in the 
wake of World War II (Shaw 2000), or - at worst - the pursuit of ‘world dominance’ 
by the US and economic interests associated with it (Gowan 1999). At the very least 
we can say that the post-war institutional order associated with US hegemony has 
actively promoted a form of neoliberalism and the Washington consensus that has 
suited the collective interests of the developed industrial economies more than it has 
the developing world. From a governance perspective it is also worth noting that some 
of the key agencies of the international order that the US continues to dominate, such 
as the World Bank, have been enthusiastic promoters of a particular form of 
governance and development policies in the non-core countries. ‘Good governance’, 
or a policy framework broadly in sympathy with the Washington Consensus, has been 
at the heart of a reformist template that is in keeping with the consolidation of a 
liberal international order in which nominally independent inter-governmental 
organisations are critical agents of change, sources of advice, and mediators of global 
pressures (Leftwich 2000). 
 
In short, while there may be an increasingly diverse array of agencies, actors and 
organisations operating under the broad rubric of global governance, and while there 
is clearly something novel about the way some issues are managed, regulated and 
organised, there is also something familiar about both the major players that influence 
crucial political and economic outcomes, and the underlying forces that motivate 
them. In such circumstances it may be wise to consider global governance, as Craig 
Murphy (2000: 799) does, as ‘more a site, one of many sites, in which struggles over 
wealth, power, and knowledge are taking place’. As such, it is not as novel as some 
accounts would have us believe. 
 
Implications and prospects 
 
Global governance, then, is a rather paradoxical animal. On the one hand, the concept 
of global governance draws our attention to a whole range of new players that either 
previously did not exist, or existed in such small numbers as to have little presence or 
impact on patterns of governance. On the other hand, however, we should not confuse 
novelty and noise for an ability to actually determine political and economic 
outcomes. One of the most striking features of contemporary patterns of governance 
is that for all the attention rightly given to the new players, some of the older, more 
familiar actors remain important. States generally, and the US in particular, still play a 
central role in underwriting and signing-off on the regulatory frameworks that govern 
transnational activities – even if the impetus for, and content of, such agreements 
increasingly emerges from unelected private sector organisations or 
intergovernmental agencies.  
 
The other familiar face of global governance is its underlying rationality: many 
writers have drawn attention to the functional necessity for forms of governance that 
transcend national borders and which provide a degree of certainty for the 
transnational economic relationships and modes of cross-border integration that have 
been such central drivers of processes associated with globalisation. This is not to 
suggest that global governance is simply an inevitable epiphenomenon of underlying 
economic reality. Rather it is to acknowledge that imperatives associated with an 
increasingly global form of free market capitalism provide a powerful force for 
regulatory harmonisation and cooperation. 
 
More troublingly, however, the discourse of global governance, especially when 
promulgated by powerful business forums and inter-governmental agencies 
dominated by ‘the West’, implicitly and sometimes explicitly encourages the idea that 
effective governance depends upon a particular sort of regulatory architecture, 
concomitant political practices and economic structures, and a preparedness and 
capacity to adopt specific sorts of ideas and values (Latham 1999). Whether the 
increasingly prominent social movements that some authors have identified as part of 
the ‘new multilateralism’ will prove capable of challenging the ruling ideas of the era 
and establishing a counter hegemonic discourse remains to be seen (see O’Brien et al 
2000). 
 
What is clear is that the emergence of global governance poses a major theoretical 
challenge for traditional, state-centric analyses of international relations. Certainly 
states remain critically important and powerful actors in the international system, but 
they are cooperating with each other, and with a range of new actors in ways that are 
simply not explicable by examining the actions of states in isolation. It is not simply 
that some states have never enjoyed the sort of sovereignty routinely and uncritically 
referred to in much of the International Relations literature (Beeson 2003), but even 
the most powerful of states are asserting themselves in new ways, and may in fact be 
consolidating their positions and influence by utilising the supposedly independent 
institutions of global governance. Global governance, in other words, is a useful 
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